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Angela McArthur , Rebecca Stewart and Mark Sandler
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ABSTRACT
Cinematic virtual reality (VR) elicits new possibilities for the treatment
of sound in space. Distinct from screen-based practices of filmmaking,
diegetic sound–image relations in immersive environments present
unique, potent affordances, in which content is at once imaginary,
and real. However, a reductive modelling of environmental realism,
in the name of ‘presence’ predominates. Yet cross-modal perception
is a noisy, flickering representation of worlds. Treating our
perceptual apparatus as stable, objective transducers, ignores the
inter-subjective potential at the heart of immersive work, and
situates users as passive spectators. This condescends to audiences
and discounts the historic symbiosis of sound–image signification,
which comes to constitute notions of verisimilitude. We understand
the tropes; we willingly suspend disbelief. This article examines
spatial sound rendering in virtual environments, probing at diegetic
realism. It calls for an experimental, aesthetic approach, suggesting
several speculative strategies, drawing from theories of embodied
cognition and acousmatic practice (amongst others) which
necessarily deal with space and time as contingencies of the
immersive. VR affords a development of the dialectic between sound
and image which distinctively involves our spatial attention. The lines
between referent and signified blur; the mediation between
representations invoked by practitioners, and those experienced by
audiences, suggest new opportunities for co-authorship.
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Introduction: spectacle of mes-mmersion
The growth in demand and supply for immersive experiences (Gartner 2016) whether for
brand-building, entertainment, or empathic journalism, seems set to continue. The enable-
ment of such experiences through new media such as virtual reality (VR) compounds what
seems to be a desire for amplified experience. A posthuman encounter with the sublime,
immersion in virtual environments allows temporary oblivion, an escape from real environ-
ments and the pressures-as-habitus of the information age. This in turn attests to the
accessibility and convergence of technologies, rich, hyperreal media, and commerce’s
backing of this form of twenty-first century nihilism (Bia 2016).
Immersive experiences such as VR, are increasingly extensive (accommodating many
sensory systems), surrounding (they approach us from any direction), vivid (rich and
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varied in informational content) and match proprioceptive feedback about our body
movements (Slater et al. 1996). As such, they dissolve subject/object oppositions, offering
us complex multi-sensory environments in which our perceptual apparatus and technol-
ogy are synthesised, with minimal mediation. VR is not in fact a new medium, but its
level of current accessibility, brought about by improvements in computing, reduction
in component size and reduced pricing, has made it a technology for the consumer. Yet
it suffers from a lack of research due to the recency of its adoption (Biocca 1999; Sharples
2016) and exists in a fragmented ecosystem. Sound’s late positioning in project timelines,
often results in a pressured, innocuous approach to spatial sound design, just when it can
be placed in any position relative to the user, and importantly, relative to its visual counter-
point – its source.
Production conventions for VR are underdeveloped compared with screen-based
media, and evolve apace, assimilating the results of research and practice in a kind of
internal combustion and accelerated reproduction. Components are developed and
brought, ‘market fresh’ from high tech industrial zones in Schenzen. Cross-disciplinary,
experimental work by engineers and psychologists working with virtual technologies con-
tinually redefine our conceptual frameworks for understanding the relationship between
the hardware and human ‘wetware’,1 work that is in turn absorbed into the pastiche-belly
of wider dissemination: interactive VR installations, workshops held in cultural institutions,
business meetups. Such empirically conducted research raises as many questions as it
does provide affirmations or refutations, in a dense quagmire of ethical issues attempting
to guide responsible use, for the young, for parents, for risk-averse though fervent manu-
facturers.2 Will production and consumption guidelines emerge from trial and error?
Today’s emphatic declamations (‘thou shalt not use jump-cuts!’) morph into tomorrow’s
anecdotes of derision. At present many challenges remain, from directing attention in a
medium which necessarily deals with freedom of head movement (there is no finite
framing as with screen-based media), to addressing emotional engagement and user inter-
activity (currently positioned as mutually exclusive). Are these obstacles to be overcome, or
openings to new ways of conceiving communication? ‘Hidden environments’ (McLuhan
and Fiore 1967; McLuhan and McLuhan 2011) – the subliminal forces of media and their
effects – enable ‘anti-environments’ after all, the forms of work that rise to challenge and
interrogate new media, and in doing so give rise to nascent creative strategies.
Some strategies will establish roots, over time bearing answers to VR’s predicaments.
They will form its material and political contingencies, and give VR meaning beyond
affect. Presently, strategies of both environment and anti-environment are in flux. Mean-
while, an explicit recognition of the extent to which sound rendering in VR is influenced by
its technologies, and their historicised ascent is useful.3
Convergence in technologies has placed production into the hands of novice prac-
titioners, and reception into the ears of naïve listeners, using (minimally) a smart phone,
cardboard headset, and their own headphones. Binaural sound synthesis, dynamically ren-
dered, offers a compelling experience even under such circumstances. In pursuit of ‘pres-
ence’ – a sense of ‘being there’, improved realism and quality may seem of key concern,
indeed they exert a powerful effect (Hendrix and Barfield 1996; Serafin and Serafin 2004).
Yet does ever-increasing fidelity produces ever-increasing aesthetic gains? We may feel we
are ‘there’, but once the impact of VR’s novelty has lessened, why is ‘there’ interesting?
What else could sound contribute?
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Audio in VR has distinct benefits, including its ability to cue user attention. It can be,
however, the victim of its own ephemeral appeal. For screen-based filmmaking, sound has
been a post-production concern. Automated dialogue replacement, foley, and sound
effects have all contributed to its efficacy in ‘adding value’ to the visual in a process of ‘synchr-
esis’, the forging of sound–image signification (Chion 1994). Sound adds value by creating:
… the definite impression, in the immediate or remembered experience one has of it, that this
information or expression ‘naturally’ comes from what is seen, and is already contained in the
image itself. Added value is what gives the (eminently incorrect) impression that sound is
unnecessary, that sound merely duplicates a meaning which in reality it brings about,
either all on its own or by discrepancies between it and the image. (Chion 1994, 5)
Chion draws our attention to the crucial role sound plays in creating, legitimising and sub-
verting meaning. Yet it remains invisible and consequently to some, even if involved in
production, imperceptible. Acknowledged more in absence than presence.
In VR, post-production is bottlenecked in the extreme, exposing for the first time the
impact of earlier mistakes, often unrecoverable. New technologies require new skills,
new constellations of teams, familiarity with products and processes that rapidly shift.
Many practitioners learn through failure. Sound – if making its inception here – precar-
iously remains a post-production affair, despite the extent of its contribution. At present
diegetic sound is usually mapped to its visual source, whilst non-diegetic sound is
placed ‘in head’ stereophonically. This is not only a result of time constraints,
however. Unlike a visual ‘shot’ sound in any media does not exist as a discrete unit,
thus lacking the ‘… enormous advantage of being a neutral unit, objectively defined,
that everyone who has made the film as well as those who watch it can agree on’
(Chion 1994, 41).
Can audiophiles be forgiven similar transgressions and visual biases? The ‘… discourse
of loss’ in which audiophiles are typically obsessed with fidelity and reproduction of the
live original as the technological ideal…’. (Chow and Steintrager 2011, 5) suggests that
even if sound is acknowledged, it represents almost a fetish in absentia. Chow and Stein-
trager see both sound’s technical and phenomenological pursuit as predicated on its
elusive qualities, its unwillingness to be caught – ‘… it has always already escaped’
(2011, 5). How faithfully then, was it ever captured?
According to Altman (1992), recordings have only partial correspondence to the orig-
inal event. Chion underlines the reasoning underlying this approach in film sound:
… the processed food of location sounds is most often skimmed of certain substances and
enriched with others. Can we hear a great ecological cry – ‘give us organic sound without addi-
tives?’ Occasionally filmmakers have tried this […] the result is totally strange. Is this because
the spectator isn’t accustomed to it? Surely. But also because reality is one thing, and its trans-
position into audiovisual two-dimensionality […] which involves radical sensory reduction, is
another. (1994, 96)
Chion perhaps stops short where he could challenge the ‘realism’ of perception itself.4 The
notion of veridicality between the world and our perception of it, is questionable. It pre-
supposes that our sensory apparatus are incidental, ‘faithful transducers’ replicating objec-
tive external reality (Lennox 2004). Such ideals of objectivity and
… presumptions of universality have [… ] led scholars to treat sounds as stable objects that
have predictable, often technologically determined, effects on a generalised perceptual
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consciousness […which] did not explicitly recognise the constitutive differences that partici-
pate in the ‘soundscape’ as amultivalent field of soundswith diverging social identities, individ-
ual creativities and affordances, biodiversities and differing abilities. (Novak and Sakakeeny
2015, 7)
The world ‘out there’ is not objectively experienced by us then. It – like media sound – is
always representational. Chion goes on:
… conventions of rendering, sound effects, and so forth, […] consist of accommodations and
adjustments […] to conserve a certain sense of realism and truth in their new representational
context. […] ‘trompe-l’oreille’ is a worthy art… . (1994, 96)
Rendering is a worthy act of creation then, it declaims a voice, a message, an identity. It
does not purport to be non-partisan. Our attraction to rendered hyperreality, immer-
sion, and other rich environments testifies: Unreality is more presence-inducing than
reality. So then, realism need not be the aim. What would Chion say about virtual,
rather than two-dimensional media? At what attentional cost do we enter immersive
unrealism?
Unbounded by frame, we have more information to parse in VR. Our spatial attention
must be allocated and coordinated across modalities, each of which initially encode infor-
mation differently. Perceptual processing and prioritisation of information from different
modalities involves complex interactions. Given our limited attentional resource,5 we
may favour ‘reliable’ sensory input over accuracy (Battaglia, Jacobs, and Aslin 2003).
How is it that ultimately we are presented with a coherent perceptual experience? How
much are we subjectively ‘gathering in’ loose ends?
This work of gathering – an effort to unify and make cohere – implies that subjectivity is
involved whenever we try to draw some boundary in the sonic domain … . (Chow and Stein-
trager 2011, 2)
There are adaptive benefits to the resolution of conflicting sensory inputs, benefits that
help explain the ‘Ventriloquist Effect’ (Alais and Burr 2004). The question then arises of
how we enjoy experiences if they rupture such correspondence, and require a higher
level of attentional resourcing?
It would appear that the detection of an irregular event is a prerequisite for an emotional
response. (Steinbeis, Koelsch, and Sloboda 2006, 1391)
Is such irregularity that which violates our expectations, jolts our complacency, and ulti-
mately moves us? Perhaps the higher cognitive load which such a situation demands
could be used to transport users along an aesthetic arc? Perhaps a one-to-one diegetic
mapping of sound to image isn’t the most effective way of communicating information,
particularly in an artistic context? Drawing from music cognition studies we might
explore the relationship between perception and aesthetics. In the inverted bell-curve of
the complexity-liking relationship (North and Hargreaves 1995; Orr and Ohlsson 2005),
content too predictable or too complex is less ‘liked’, whilst at the peak of the inverted
bell, complexity and liking are in an optimal position. Might sound–image incongruence,
initially unexpected yet systematically applied (thus recognisable), move users along a
similar aesthetic arc? What might the optimal position be for liking/complexity? Would
this vary between audiences, or for the same person over time? Could it be exploited to
sustain interest?
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It is not the smooth simulacrum of reality but the ambiguity in the continually shifting back-
ground of sound-image relations that serves to hold the viewer-auditor’s interest, promising
suspense and surprise even where […] there is no narrative. (Johnson 1989, 26)
Complexity – the impression of randomness despite regularity in incongruent sound–
image relations, can ‘continually shift’, can be increased or decreased to induce a hetero-
geneous, emergent experience. The site of this ‘becoming’ experience is distributed,
with cognitive processes acting to organise further meaning from arranged audio-
visual phenomena. Cognitive processes themselves contain personal and collective his-
tories, such that the act of reception is also one of authorship. There is no supplicant
with abdicated sensoria. VR is socially composed with a level of inter-subjective pro-
duction which may be unprecedented – individual differences are exacerbated in
immersive settings due to the egocentric placement of audiences, and the orbiting of
events and constituents such that ‘everything is interpreted relative to you’ (Blesser
and Salter 2009, 49).
What understanding then, need practitioners of spatial sound design for immersive
media have, of cognition? As an example, Chion discusses a kind of substitute memory:
The question of verisimilitude, is a terribly ambiguous and complicated one […] sound that
rings true for the spectator and sound that is true are two very different things. In order to
assess the truth of a sound, we refer much more to codes established by cinema itself, by tele-
vision, and narrative representational arts in general […] quite often we have no personal
memory we might refer to regarding a scene we see. (1994, 107)
Here media acts as a substitute, codified recollection, not just due to a lack of experience,
but as Chion explains, also resulting from the strength of impression left by media. This in
turn focuses our concern on sound’s renderingmore than its reproduction, even in a reality
that is virtual. This symbiosis, and the partiality of our auditory ‘representational’ archives,
has been acknowledged:
Whereas comparing the visual architecture of two spaces through pictures does not place
a burden on short-term memory, comparing the aural architecture of two spaces involves
[… ] the unreliability of auditory memory … . (Blesser and Salter 2009, 17)
Despite Altman’s (1992) ‘reproductive’ fallacy in cinema sound (which holds that the image
is creatively unfaithful, but sound is automatically faithful), we can see that practitioners
have exploited sound–image disjuncture and recognised audience cognitive subjectivities
before immersive media assumed its current forms. The line between diegesis and
mimesis was blurred by film and theatre sound–image relations, to effect. Some of
these effects may be so well established that they exist below the threshold of awareness.
A banal example – in real life we would not hear a cat purring unless we were extremely
close to it. In film sound practice an incredulously amplified purr is an acceptable represen-
tation of reality.6 This acceptance underlines the value of expression over realism. Tar-
kovsky clearly states the case:
… sounds of the world reproduced naturalistically in cinema are impossible to imagine: there
would be a cacophony. Everything that appeared on the screen would have to be heard on
the soundtrack, and the result would amount to sound not being treated at all in film. If
there is no selection then the film is tantamount to silent, since it has no sound expression
of its own. (1989, 161)
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When dealing with sound that has been designed, we necessarily do so aesthetically (aes-
thetic appreciation as perceptual experience). Yet our symbiotic absorption of mediated
‘realities’ means we soon incorporate them into an updated range of realism. The treat-
ment of sound–image relations may want its aesthetic expression, but we could exercise
caution here. A critique of the hyperreal as a semiotic structure and nihilistic device pro-
vides a useful reminder (Eco 1986, 1989; Böhme 1993; Baudrillard, 1994) that doppelgän-
gers are elusive figures whom we would do well to recognise, less they succeed as the
signified, and flatten our sense of perspective. As Böhme prompts, any ‘ordering’ of
elements contains some agenda, whether declared or implicit. Without interrogation,
we risk perpetuating hierarchies and inequalities in the most benign or beguiling of forms:
[A] response to the progressive aestheticisation of reality … aesthetics represents a real social
power. There are aesthetic needs and an aesthetic supply … to the aesthetics of the work of
art we can now add … the aesthetics of everyday life, the aesthetics of commodities and a
political aesthetics. (Böhme 1993, 125)
Our complicity with spectacle neuters us (at least in part). Thus there is a certain morality in
imagination, and the ability to draw ourselves away from an enveloping, mes-mmersive
present toward disjuncture, the rupturing of expectation, the artwork as ‘anti-
environment’.
Diegetic anti-realism
The real can never be represented; representation alone can be represented. For in order to be
represented, the real must be known, and knowledge is always already a form of represen-
tation. (Altman 1992, 46)
Realism, and so anti-realism, is a continually shifting concern. VR’s ‘reality’ is bound by
inherited representational systems until its own emerge. And whilst they do, we might
ask – what affordances does VR offer for effective communication? Tarkovsky asserts:
… accurately recorded sound adds nothing to the image system of cinema, for it still has no
aesthetic content […] if the real sounds are distorted so that they no longer correspond with
the image – then the film acquires a resonance. (1989, 162)
Such deviations, applied to three dimensions in a virtual experience, may engender effec-
tive strategies for designing spatial sound in a world that is wilfully incomplete, awaiting
the interpretive ‘filling up’ by individual users’ meaning.
We need an alternative concept that assumes neither the completeness nor the consistency of
a real space. (Blesser and Salter 2009, 132)
Exaggerated sound–image interactions may for example ‘break’ the representational
frame in an otherwise unframed environment, allowing for real-time subjectivity and
awareness of illusion, an ebb and flow of tension and aesthetic release. This may all be
achievable in an environment which promotes phenomenological presence. But rule-
breaking is an act involving less deliberation than rule-making:
When inventing new rules and applying them in novel ways, an artist is just as likely to create
musical experiments that have little enduring value. The application of aural architecture to
cinema is a good example of aesthetically pleasing spatial rules that never presume a
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space as a real environment. […] unrelated aural and visual spaces often coexist simul-
taneously… . (Blesser and Salter 2009, 160)
Rupturing for the sake of rupturing will only take us so far; too much may break presence
and fail to engage audiences (who have an overwhelming array of choice and lack of time).
Too little may go unnoticed. Experimentation is requisite, and it is contended that a sys-
tematic, considered strategy will be less likely to become the very thing it seeks to
subvert – spectacle.
Speculative strategies for experimentation
… the history of music illustrates the attempt to find ways of describing, notating, and there-
fore identifying sounds, without specifying a cause for them… . (Scruton 1997, 3)
From whom should we draw inspiration for spatial sound design? An experimental palette
may include a diverse a range of disciplines (a hybrid approach being appropriate for this
hybrid medium).
Aesthetic philosophy
Aesthetic philosophy, working towards a new aesthetic of ‘acoustic atmospheres’ (Böhme
1993) would allow us to consider the relationship between environmental qualities and
human states. Böhme suggests we treat aesthetics experientially rather than dialectically.
This suits VR as immersive environment:
This new aesthetics circumscribes […] their very immersion [… ] Atmosphere surrounds,
includes, involves, envelops, and gives forth both the qualities of the environment and the
experiencing human […] in order to stand as atmosphere, a spatial arrangement needs to
be experienced or imagined into being. (Grant 2014, 21)
But should we rely on its sensuous or formal characteristics without concern for the social
function of the work? Böhme cautioned against this. Updating metaphors of materiality in
filmmaking practice (for example those of the Constructivists) requires that we celebrate
the innate sensual properties of aesthetics in spatial sound design, and the dissolution of
subject–object authorship. Here we may look to theories of embodied cognition.
Embodied cognition
Theories of embodied cognition suggest that form and meaning cannot be phenomenally
or logically separated.7 Perception directly engages with meanings that are in the world
and body, but uses symbolic representational structures to do so. This is a useful segue
into a strategy which leverages the phenomenology of experience whilst (through
designed-in incongruence), foregrounding our subjectivities.
Lakoff and Johnson (2003) offer conceptual metaphors and image schemas8 for under-
standing the way that we relate to sound (a more abstract phenomena) in terms of our
concrete experience. This process in turn leads to systematic conceptual metaphors and
related expressions, and might provide a useful framework for incongruence. As an
example strategy, incongruence might deviate aesthetically by slowing the tempo of
sounds rising in pitch and quickening the tempo of those falling. This would represent
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a clear disjuncture, whilst adhering to principles of concrete experience (we slow down
when moving upwards due to the greater exertion needed to counter gravity’s effect).
This might provide artistic interest whilst not ‘breaking’ presence.
Embodiment is not, however, de facto reflexive. In discussing Benjamin’s (1936) essay
on the effect of reproduction on the ‘aura’ of a work of art, Böhme argues that the avant
garde:
… did not succeed in discarding aura like a coat […] What they did succeed in
doing was to thematize the aura […] this made it clear that what makes a work an artwork
cannot be grasped soley through its concrete qualities. (1993, 116–117)
He goes on to cite Benjamin’s description of aura as spatio-temporally contingent, and apt
as analogous to an atmosphere, internalised through breathing, entering the ‘bodily
economy of tension and expansion’ (Böhme 1993, 117) in an act of inter-subjective
absorption, extension, and spatial perception. Layering, at the concrete and conceptual
strata, means its
… human character is perceivable [… ] audiences are capable of perceiving properties of
works as realizing artists’ manipulations of materials … . (Gerwen 2012, 223)
Crediting audiences with this ability echoes Chion’s (1999) concept of the ‘acousmêtre’
that calls attention to the false sense of unity in sound–image relations, provided
through synchrony. The acousmêtre, being ambiguous, leaves the source of the sound
open to interpretation; it destabilises conditions. The anti-environment continually
shifts. Which practical examples can we draw from, which tackle sound in space phenom-
enologically and conceptually? Sound studies critique sound beyond both its formal and
ideological characteristics, even those which seem nebulous, such as its ubiquity and
panopticism. This bodes well for immersion.
Sound studies and acousmatic practice
Recent developments in sound studies are encouraging. ‘Acoustemology’ (acoustics +
epistemology) for example, theorises sound:
… as a way of knowing. In doing so it inquires into what is knowable, through sound and lis-
tening. (Feld 2015, 12)
This kind of approach necessarily deals with socially constructed knowledge and practice,
refusing sound’s ‘objective universality’ by positioning itself:
… against ‘soundscape’, the key legacy term associated with [R Murray] Schafer [acoustemol-
ogy] refuses to sonically analogise or appropriate ‘landscape’, with all its physical distance
from agency and perception. (Feld 2015, 15)
Meanwhile scholars and practitioners of acousmatic and electroacoustic music deal with
notions of space as essential components. Smalley’s (1997) notions of source-bonding
or surrogacy are two foundations for compositional strategies. Source bonding can be
real or imagined and is:
The natural tendency to relate sounds to supposed sources and causes, and to relate sounds
to each other because they appear to have shared or associated origins. (1997, 110)
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Surrogacy meanwhile describes the progressive remoteness of sound source from directly
experienced physical gestures. Smalley (1997, 124) provides guidelines for a global spatial
style for a work9 which could be applied to spatial sound design for VR (indeed his first
guideline, that of ‘single spatial setting’, a cumulative spatial awareness in which a user
appreciates (over time) the topology of a space within which a work sits, can be seen at
work in ‘Stifled’ – a VR game released in 2017 where the world is revealed through the
sound-input of a user’s microphone).10
In his discussion of such ideas, Emmerson discusses how our auditory processing
utilises:
… established frames of reference when confronted with spaces, real or imaginary. Using elec-
tronics we may conjure up this increasingly wide set of alternatives. On the one hand the com-
poser may attempt spatial re-presentation, that is the re-creation of an appropriate ‘real’ space
to support a narrative; this can approach a kind of onomatopoeia in which the idiosyncrasies
of a real space maybe mimicked…we may move from direct imitation […] through increas-
ingly vague evocations to more remote impressions of colour and texture. (2007, 101)
He describes this range of options as exactly parallel to the mimetic axis of the materials of
electroacoustic music. Gerwen’s (2012) caution that we cannot hear everyday sounds
acousmatically, as we cannot abstract sound events from their objects (including our
own bodies), is a useful caveat. Sound may be intentionally organised and decoded, but
its ‘sounding’ (its environmental and performative realisation) is integral to its appreciation
as aesthetic expression. Gerwen, though not the first to do so, calls for critical listening.
Classical cognitivism
A classical cognitivist view may be useful to understand aesthetics in the context of expec-
tation. Composer Frank Lerdahl usefully states:
Aesthetic Claim 1: The best music utilizes the full potential of our cognitive resources.
Aesthetic Claim 2: The best music arises from an alliance of a compositional grammar with the
listening grammar. (1992, 119)
Lerdahl’s definition of musical grammar, is ‘a limited set of rules that can generate indefi-
nitely large sets of musical events and/or their structural descriptions’ (1992, 99). He sub-
divides this into two elements – compositional grammar, consciously employed to
generate and organise events, and listening grammar, more or less unconsciously
employed by auditors, and in effect generating mental representations of the music.
Lerdahl points to the prerequisite for ‘stability conditions’ to achieve comprehension
and avoid boredom in the experience of listening (expectation and the violation of expec-
tation combine to form satisfying musical experience where listener is neither constantly
surprised nor constantly correct in their predictions). Transitional probabilities – the stat-
istical regularities of sequences of events – can be learnt with surprisingly little exposure,
with semantically impoverished stimuli, and by infants (Saffron et al. 1999). The learning
and exploitation of these stability conditions are engendered by systematically applied
incongruence, which can then be ruptured to destabilise for aesthetic or narrative interest.
Sound may be exceptionally placed to respond to the ideology of stability, which accord-
ing to Voegelin:
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… does not exist but is assumed and pretended by a visual ideology. Sound by contrast
negates stability through the force of sensory experience… . (2010, 11–12)
We cannot exert control over sound’s ability to move us, we cannot shut it out. Audition is
the eternal ‘site of performative embodiment’ (Barton and Windeyer 2012, 198) which
extends beyond our will, enacting our bodies as environmental alarms. Sound is not
stable, nor as we have seen, is our perception of it. How then, to allow for this in our
ways of discussing it? How to mirror this fluidity in the very syntax with which we describe
audio-vision?
Taxonomies
A final strategy, that of re-thinking taxonomies of sound–image, is now suggested. Many
have contributed to establishing classifications in this field (Percheron and Butzel 1980;
Raskin 1992; Chion 1994) to address our visually biased syntax for film (as Altman
(1992) points out, we go to ‘see’ a film, we discuss ‘point of view’ etc.).
Even now the cinema has kept its ontologically visual definition no less intact. A film without
sound remains a film; a film with no image, or at least without a visual frame for projection, is
not a film. Except conceptually. (Chion 1994, 143)
This biasing persists despite sound (unlike image) retaining its dimensionality in media.
Image, whether screen-based or post-screen, is flattened. It flickers. We see stitch-lines, pix-
ilation and other artefacts of its reproduction:
… a filmed object loses a dimension in the recording, recorded sound maintains its dimen-
sions… . Recorded sound thus has a higher coefficient of ‘reality’ than the image… . (Stam
2000, 214)
Addressing this insidious imbalance may require new schema. Raskin (1992) situates both
actual and subjective sound within the boundaries of the diegetic, seeing sound as a
typology:
1) as a means for including in a stylistic profile of a given director, an exact description of
his/her sound ‘palette’ - perhaps even as it evolves from film to film;
2) as a construct enabling us to deal with clearly defined varieties of sound, one at a time,
in a systematic effort to chart the functions of film sound; and
3) as a basis for determining to what degree any given model for studying film aesthetics,
encompasses a full range of variables with respect to sound. (1992, 12)
The idea of ‘incongruent’ (or at least playful) taxonomies is best reported by Foucault. We
can make such rich, idiosyncratic categorisation our own, and unbind it from historical,
objective alterity.
… animals are divided into: ‘(a) belonging to the Emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) suckling
pigs, (e) sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h) included in the present classification, (i) frenzied,
(j) innumerable, (k) drawn with a very fine camelhair brush, (l) et cetera, (m) having just broken
the water pitcher, (n) that from a long way off look like flies’. In the wonderment of this tax-
onomy, the thing we apprehend […] as the exotic charm of another system of thought, is the
limitation of our own, the stark impossibility of thinking that. (Foucault 1970, xv)
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Such taxonomy may not relate directly to sound–image relations in VR, but the freedom
and possibility underpinning them may rupture perceived wisdom, in favour of unper-
ceived imagination.
Wrapping up: keeping it unreal
Without the sound technologies to enable dynamic spatial rendering, the question of
keeping it real or unreal is moot. Intentional rupturing would not be possible, only unin-
tentional (wild) glitching. Deliberate rupturing must exceed realism in some sense, and
could usefully defer to the reception of media as an act of co-constitution:
If we expect spatial music to be something that a listener can be inside and can explore, then it
may be necessary to surrender some control to the listener. (Lennox 2004, 30)
Enabling audiences freedom to engage their own subjectivities offers spatial audio aes-
thetics as something which non-spatial audio cannot be. According to Lennox (2004)
there cannot be a strong argument that the only kind of spatial structure we could under-
stand is that found in real environments. Wemay use the proxy of immersive experience to
(at least temporarily) discharge residual anxieties, a mental ‘stress ball’, absorbing the
excesses of a digital existence with which our corporeality struggles. Yet we need to
look beyond such techno-seductive affects. Immersive experiences may seem less
mediated than ever, but the complex and multifarious systems they arise from and
serve contain their own organisational aesthetics. Buyer beware.
New practices for the presentation of multi-sensory experience will emerge and ossify,
borrowing from prior mediums as they do. Any claims of objective realism uphold hidden
environments, and the move from real to virtual environment is uncanny. In designing
sound for space, practitioners may need to do more than upskill technically, as they
carry new ethical responsibilities forward. Yet the promise of this medium, of an aesthetic,
immersive space in which sound is crucial and can be highly designed, and variously
decoded, is incentive enough.
In evaluating the aesthetics of spatial audio in VR, we might recall Chion’s (1994) con-
sideration of Tati’s work, and ask ourselves, as he does, whether the:
… audiovisual strategy produce[s] added value? That is, are we dealing with sound that enli-
vens the image, and deepens it in spatial terms? (1994, 125)
Notes
1. Two useful authors to review are Mel Slater, Research Professor at the University of Barcelona
whose work uses VR to examine body ownership illusions as studied in cognitive neuro-
science, and Pontus Larsson, whose research encompasses multimodal interaction, presence
and virtual acoustics, and who currently working with Volvo Technology within the Human
Factors group often work in interdisciplinary research teams.
2. For a detailed account including recommendations for researchers and consumers, see
Madary and Metzinger (2016) ‘Real Virtuality: A Code of Ethical Conduct. Recommendations
for Good Scientific Practice and the Consumers of VR-Technology’.
3. For an account of the historical development of sound in early cinema which foregrounds the
triumph of idiosyncratic practices over rationally presented guidance, see Altman’s essay
‘Sound Space’ in Altman (1992).
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4. As examples, Bregman’s (1990) ‘Auditory Scene Analysis: The perceptual Organization of
Sound’, and Spence’s Crossmodal Research Lab at Oxford University, alert us to the perceptual
illusions which underlie our reasonable if flawed impressions of the sensory world.
5. The concept of human attention (behavioural and cognitive processing) as a limited resource
which can be allocated by concentrating certain aspects of information while ignoring other
others.
6. For a discussion of these concerns see Bottomore’s (1999; 2001) work on sound practices in
early cinema.
7. For an introduction see Anderson (2003) ‘Embodied Cognition: A Field Guide’ and Wilson
(2002) ‘Six Views of Embodied Cognition’.
8. Lakoff and Johnson ‘Metaphors We Live By’ (2003) 2nd ed.; Johnson (1987), ‘The Body in the
Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason’; Lakoff and Johnson (1999), ‘Phil-
osophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought’. Lakoff and
Johnson argue that (particularly metaphorical) language is not simply a mental construction,
but is shaped by bodily mediation of the world, and so our corporeal experience shapes our
thinking, and is not distinct from cognition.
9. (1) Single spatial setting. The single setting has two aspects. A work can be set in a single type
of space of which the listener is aware at the outset. On the other hand, different aspects of a
space can be revealed over time. Spatial awareness is cumulative, and the listener eventually
realises that there is a global spatial topology into which the whole work fits. For example, the
extremes of proximity and distance are unlikely to be known until the work has advanced
somewhat. (2) Multiple spatial settings. Throughout the work, the listener is aware of different
types of space which cannot be resolved into a single setting. (3) Spatial simultaneity. Imagine
a very present granular texture directly in front of you as if actually within your listening space,
while in the distance a door closes in a large reverberant space. You are aware of simultaneous
spaces. (4) Implied spatial simultaneity. Implied simultaneity occurs when the listener remains
aware of the existence of a space in its absence. This can occur, for example, when contrasting
spaces are intercut and alternated (spatial interpolation), giving the impression of simultaneity
even though the spaces are presented successively. This is related to film, where in spite of the
cutting between successive events, they are considered concurrent. (5) Spatial passage.
Passage between spaces can be sudden (interrupted passage), repeatedly intercut (interp-
olated passage) or more gradually merged (graduated passage). (6) Spatial equilibrium.
What is the relative balance between types of perspective and spatial texture in the work?
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